Photo by Sasha Pleshco on Unsplash
On 28 September 2025, Moldova arrives at a critical crossroad, not only electing a new parliament but also determining its geopolitical future. These elections will either reinforce the country’s commitment to European integration or lead to its transformation into a grey zone of instability along the borders of the European Union and NATO. A recent CBS Research poll shows the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) leading with 29.7%, while pro-Russian parties such as the Revival Party (13.2%) and “Our Party” (7.5%) lag behind. However, nearly 27% of voters remain undecided – a group that has become the primary target of external actors aiming to disrupt Moldova’s European trajectory.
Moscow’s intentions are no longer hidden. The removal of Dmitry Kozak, the former Kremlin envoy for post-Soviet affairs, and the transfer of influence operations to Sergei Kiriyenko, a key architect of hybrid political strategies, signals a shift from soft power to a readiness to employ coercive and destabilising measures if the election outcome is unfavourable to the Kremlin.
According to the Moldovan authorities, Russia spent nearly €100 million in 2024 attempting to sabotage the presidential election and the referendum on EU integration. In 2025, a further scheme worth $39 million was uncovered, routed through Russia’s Promsvyazbank. These funds have been used to bribe politicians, finance parties and media outlets, and organise protest movements. Simultaneously, the FSB’s Fifth Service has coordinated a network of bots and trolls spreading fake content and disinformation across YouTube, Telegram, TikTok, and Facebook, with a particular focus on discrediting President Maia Sandu and the PAS.
Destabilisation efforts go well beyond digital influence. Russia has begun recruiting young men from sports clubs and criminal networks for possible involvement in violent protests. On 22 September, Moldovan authorities detained 74 individuals who had trained in Serbia in weapons handling, urban combat, and police confrontation. Their connections to Russian intelligence and Moldovan political operatives confirm that the upcoming protests are externally planned and orchestrated.
Added to this is a Kremlin-backed initiative that grants Moldovan citizens preferential work rights in Russia for 2025–2026. Framed as labour policy, this move is actually a covert form of political influence and vote-buying. Preparations for post-election protests are under way regardless of the outcome. If pro-Russian forces win, a campaign to defend the victory will likely follow. If they lose, accusations of electoral fraud are expected to surface immediately.
This plan also involves registering pro-Russian activists as international observers and inviting foreign politicians from Europe’s far-left and far-right parties to create the illusion of legitimate international oversight. This forms part of a pre-arranged strategy to undermine the credibility of the vote on the global stage.
Meanwhile, Russia is working to reshape Moldova’s political landscape. As the current pro-Russian parties, including the Communists and Socialists, face declining popularity and damage to their reputation, Moscow is creating new political entities with a pro-European facade but hidden loyalties. Leaders such as Ion Ceban have already fallen out of favour in the EU, and potential successors to Igor Dodon and Vladimir Voronin are being considered. Irina Vlah is also seen as a potential unifying figure for these rebranded groups.
Religious institutions are also being exploited. The Russian Orthodox Church and its Moldovan branch are actively campaigning against Moldova’s European ambitions and promoting pro-Kremlin narratives. The so-called cultural and educational centres in Russia are involved in transporting protesters to Moldova, further blurring the lines between state, religious, and civic organisations in Moscow’s destabilisation toolkit.
Perhaps most alarmingly, Moldova faces the risk of becoming a launchpad for regional chaos. If the Kremlin’s strategy succeeds, the country may turn into an anti-Western outpost with direct repercussions for security in Ukraine’s Odesa region, the stability of Romanian-Ukrainian border areas, and the operation of vital transit corridors. In such a scenario, European financial support could be withheld, and Moldova could be plunged into a state of managed instability right on the EU’s doorstep.
Conversely, if Moldova remains committed to its pro-European course, it would deal a significant blow to Russia’s broader ambitions in Eastern Europe and serve as a deterrent to similar influence operations elsewhere. The coming weeks will therefore not only shape Moldova’s future but also reveal whether the West is truly ready to defend democratic choices made by its neighbours in the face of coordinated hybrid aggression.
