Photo by Miguel Bruna on Unsplash
On the anniversary of Russia’s invasion and brutal destruction of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure, we asked our energy editor Mike Parr to reflect on how Ukraine might future-proof its energy systems.
A conference took place at the Brussels Press Club on the 21st February entitled “International Hybrid Conference on European Energy Strategy” for which the twin foci were, the Russian war against Ukraine and EU energy policy in the light of this. This article will highlight some of the points made by speakers, whilst trying to answer this question: at the end of the war, what direction for Ukraine with respect to energy and by extension the EU? given the EU policies of de-carbonisation of power coupled to a move to an all-electric society.
The opening speaker, the Polish MEP Jack Saryusz-Wolski claimed that many “Green” NGOs in Brussels are supported or financed by Russia. Mr Saryusz-Wolski is also against renewables but does favour new nuclear. Support for a nuclear renaissance in the EU was echoed by several of the speakers. One of the attendees claimed that the poor performance of recent nuclear projects (over-budget and over-time) in Finland, France (still being built) and UK (Hinkley Point – being built) was due to political failure. Germany also came in for criticism regarding its abandonment of nuclear, whilst being happy to import nuclear electricity from France. However, the commentators glossed over a German political reality, on a multi-decadal basis around 75% of the German electorate do not want new nuclear reactors. Given that proportional representation is a feature of the German electoral system, political parties that do support new nuclear will be forever in a minority, if they exist at all.
The issue of “energy return on investment” (eROI) was raised by one of the speakers, Dr Schernikau who made the valid point that “energy policy should not favour wind, solar, biomass, hydro, nuclear, gas or coal but should support all energy systems such that energy shortages and energy poverty are avoided”. EU energy policy claims to be technology neutral, whilst opposing in most cases state aid for energy. This approach results in wind and solar being cheaper than fossil and nuclear. Dr Schernikau claims that this is only the case when “levelised costs of electricity” (LCOEs) are considered. He claims that the situation reverses if “Full Cost of Electricity” is used.
What does all this mean for Ukraine, once the war ends? The country is similar to many European countries having a generation mix of nuclear, fossil, hydro generation plus a small amount of renewables (wind and solar). Readers will be familiar with the concerns over the massive nuclear station at Zapporrizzhia (currently occupied by the Russian invading forces), and the problems at Chernobyl and the attacks by Russia on an electrical power system designed for centralised generation and regional distribution. This is not a criticism of the Ukraine system, all EU power systems are like this.
When Russia is defeated, and Ukraine rebuilds its energy system, does it rebuild based on a centralised generation system (nuclear etc.) given the known vulnerabilities of such a system? Does it build de-centralised renewables? Can it do both?
Complicating matters further, there is a broad band of fossil resource (coal, oil and gas) running North West from Luhansk, via Kharkiv and up to Sumy (roughly parallel with the border with Russia), with similar resources centered around Lviv. Most speakers at the conference were in favour of the exploitation of these fossil resources. However, this sits badly with an EU that wants to decarbonise its energy mix and a Ukraine ambition to join the EU. Furthermore, it seems unwise to consider exploiting a key energy resource sitting next to the Russian border, even when the war ends with some sort of peace agreement.
Given the above, a rebuilt Ukraine energy system needs to be resilient to the threat of future attack, low carbon, deliver low cost energy and be as localised as possible. The final point supports resilience. For example, each small town and village (there are thousands in Ukraine) has its own renewables. This would consist of one or two wind turbines, roof-top or ground mount solar, an electrolyser and local gas storage. This is a fundamentally different type of target than a coal or nuclear plant. The renewables may not, in all circumstances meet 100% of the inhabitants needs, (no need to go off-grid) but this would be to confuse the good enough with the perfect. Furthermore, such projects are being developed now, in Europe, as “community energy schemes” supplying both heat and electricity. These deliver low-cost renewable energy to a given community, who eventually “own” all the renewable equipment, i.e. they own their local power station. A good business case exists for such schemes, which for the most part can be financed privately.
Clearly cities such as Kyiv require a different approach to energy supply and some centralised power stations will be needed. However, there are many good reasons for taking a distributed energy approach when rebuilding the Ukraine power system. As such, renewables coupled to hydrogen production offer resilience, low cost and low-carbon power.
