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Many young, non-white and Muslim, as well as central and Eastern European citizens in the 27 EU members states feel excluded, disillusioned or uninterested in the politics of the European Union, according to a major new report published today by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and European Cultural Foundation (ECF).
The report, entitled “Welcome to Barbieland: European sentiment in the year of wars and elections”, is the third edition of an annual study of the European sentiment conducted by the two institutions.
Based on research across the EU’s 27 member states, the report explores the extent to which European citizens and governments display a sense of belonging to a common space, share a common future, and subscribe to common values as of mid-2024.
It also highlights three blind spots that, if left unaddressed, could threaten the future of the European project.
Authored by ECFR senior policy fellow, Pawel Zerka, the study contends that many Europeans might now see their continent and its political institutions as too white, too Western, or too boomer.
The study contends that non-white and Muslim Europeans, people in Central and Eastern Europe, and Europe’s youngest citizens have all, over the past year, under-participated in Europe – albeit for a variety of reasons.
Zerka notes that non-white and Muslim Europeans have been exposed to new xenophobic narratives following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the sharp rise in support for far-right political parties during this year’s European elections.
He also analyses the origins of lukewarm pro-Europeanism in Central and Eastern Europe and explores the troubling political apathy and support for far-right and anti-establishment parties among younger citizens of the bloc.
Blind spots noted in the study include:
- Non-white and Muslim Europeans have had a particularly difficult year, with many experiencing a feeling of alienation because of their ethnicity or religion.
In the wake of the October 7 attacks in Israel, the EU’s Agency for Fundamental Rightss identified a major rise of both antisemitic and anti-Muslim hatred and violence. Since many European leaders and governments took the side of Israel in the period thereafter, the report notes that a schism developed between citizens, and that this left large numbers of Muslims in Europe at odds with the direction of government policy.
First-place finishes for the far-right in the European Parliament elections, in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria, and Hungary – and strong showings in the Netherlands and Germany – has also fed an anti-immigration discourse in large parts in Europe, which is now cutting through to the political mainstream in several member states. The report also cites issues around political representation, and the impression of lasting discrimination inside some European countries.
- Lukewarm pro-Europeanism in Central and Eastern Europe was also apparent over the past year.
The relatively muted celebrations of the 20th anniversary of EU membership for eight Central and Eastern European countries, combined with low voter turnout in the European Parliament elections across this region, reflect a cooled enthusiasm for the EU, Zerka argues. The report suggests that some citizens are disappointed with the real benefits of EU membership, while the normalization of Euroscepticism in the region indicates a shift in attitudes towards Europe. Observing tensions in Western Europe’s diverse societies (e.g., in response to the war in Gaza), many in this region of Europe may feel justified in rejecting multiculturalism. Meanwhile, politicians trying to benefit from xenophobic attitudes face worryingly little political opposition. - Young Europeans – though generally more pro-European and tolerant than older generations – showed limited interest in European elections.
Troublingly, when they did vote, many young people supported far-right or anti-establishment parties. Citing examples such as Poland, where a far-right party won the youth vote, and in Germany and France, where large numbers of young people supported AfD and Rassemblement National, Zerka suggests this reflects a sense of not being represented by established political forces, which are often viewed as “boomer” parties. This feeling of “voicelessness” could spill over into how young people perceive the EU, risking their disengagement from European affairs or their rejection of the EU if they see it as detached from their concerns. - The three blind spots all point to the same danger for the European project:
its drift towards an ethnic, rather than civic, understanding of Europeanness, Zerka argues. The voicelessness of non-white and Muslim inhabitants risks further marginalizing these groups, allowing xenophobia to flourish in EU policy and discourse. The unchallenged ethnocentrism of Central and Eastern European politicians risks normalizing such attitudes across the region and in the rest of the EU. And, if young Europeans grow up in this environment, some may adopt xenophobic views, while others if more principled may reject the EU, viewing it as standing for values that are not their own.
Steps the EU needs to take to address these challenges:
To counter these challenges, Pawel Zerka calls on all those who consider themselves pro-European to build and expand channels for participation among different groups of the bloc’s citizenry, reject the ethnic conception of Europeanness, and fill the civic conception of Europeanness with substance. He argues that this can be achieved by:
- Giving value to participation:
The report recommends political parties diversify their membership and voting base, both nationally and at the European level, to combat the growing crisis of representation. For younger voters, the report cites promising precedents from Austria, Belgium, and Germany, where the voting age in European Parliament elections has been lowered to 16. Pro-European parties should also broaden the range of topics they discuss with young people. And, moreover, the interests of future generations (including today’s youth) should be reflected in the EU’s democratic decisions.
- Rejecting the ethnic conception of Europeanness:
Zerka argues that pro-European politicians often pay lip service to values like universalism, equality, and secularism while presenting immigration from Africa and Asia as a threat to European “civilisation.” It is urgent for pro-Europeans to resist the temptation of staying quiet on issues of migration and diversity for short-term electoral gains. Responsible politicians should call out xenophobia and explain to voters that certain attitudes may undermine the social peace in already diverse societies.
- Filling the “civic” conception of Europeanness with substance:
To strengthen the EU’s civic identity, the bloc needs to be recognized as a force for positive change – delivering on issues such as the economy, security, and climate change. Addressing migration fears through lawful border control and policies to stop irregular migration will reduce the need for disputes over Europe’s ethnic identity.
Commenting on the study, author and ECFR senior policy fellow Pawel Zerka told this site: “In recent weeks, Mario Draghi has dominated the conversation in Brussels by focusing minds on the need to revive the bloc’s economy, which is losing its competitive edge. But if the economy is the EU’s engine, then ‘European sentiment’ should be recognised as its fuel. And what is currently happening to European sentiment requires urgent attention as well. Otherwise, we risk running out of fuel – or running on dirty fuel.”
