Photo by Roman Skrypnyk on Unsplash
Europe and the United States are now succeeding where Russia has long tried and failed: maintaining steadfast unity in support of Ukraine, alongside a cool, pragmatic scepticism towards any so-called guarantees that Moscow tries to use to position itself as both aggressor and arbiter.
Following diplomatic musical chairs in Anchorage and Washington, it has become clear that Vladimir Putin misjudged the situation. His attempt to exploit his amicable relations with Donald Trump to pressure Kyiv into accepting an unfavourable ceasefire plan has been blocked by the real alignment of the United States and Europe behind the principle of nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. As The Washington Post observed, the U.S.– European meetings have effectively shifted the burden of the next move onto Putin. His hawkish factions are now publicly frustrated at the lack of any imposed compromise on Kyiv.
Simultaneously, Moscow is trying to revive the old tactic of security co-guarantees, a demand for a veto over any Western decision concerning Ukraine’s defence. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has suggested multilateral guarantees involving permanent UN Security Council members, including Russia itself. The goal remains unchanged since 2022: to create safeguards that hinder support to Kyiv. Western officials have already dismissed such proposals as unacceptable. They equate them with replacing Ukraine’s sovereignty with Russian dominance, effectively a veto on Ukraine’s future. Even Lavrov’s interviews make this clear: without us, nothing happens, which effectively means nothing without a Russian veto.
In response, Western policymaking has become more precise. Kyiv has publicly announced its goal to purchase at least US$1 billion worth of American arms each month – a clear sign of long-term requirements and transparency. This also shows that Ukraine can turn political goodwill into real capability.
In Berlin and Paris, a new approach to deterring Russia is emerging. Germany has reaffirmed its commitment to guarantee systems and is concentrating on strengthening Ukraine’s armed forces and defence industry. In several European capitals, non-combat presence such as training teams, advisory missions, and observer deployments along the frontline are being considered. These practical measures aim to prevent any breathing space for the Russian military. These European actions reflect Washington’s stance: increased support for Kyiv and a firm rejection of a Russian veto.
The support network for finance and military efforts strengthens this narrative. In May and June, European backing for Ukraine remained strong, shifting from unlocking reserve weapon caches to entering direct industrial agreements. Alongside the U.S., this establishes the basis for continued supply through 2026 and beyond. Predictability is now essential for expanding Ukrainian production and integrating long-range systems into a unified strategy.
Political signals from the U.S. after summer meetings stress one thing: this isn’t about a quick deal on Russian terms, it’s about preventing Moscow from monopolising the definition of guarantees.
Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin has responded as expected: prolonging negotiations, insisting on the right to veto, replacing talks with bombardments and missile terror, all the while hiding behind propaganda about one people and a neo-colonial Kyiv regime. But even within its peace rhetoric, the Kremlin shows an unwillingness to yield anything short of Ukrainian capitulation.
On the battlefield, Ukraine is already making Russia pay for its aggression with strikes on military infrastructure and logistics deep within Russian territory, disrupting any plans to exhaust Ukraine’s air defences. In this context, Moscow’s demands for neutrality, demilitarisation, and veto-laden guarantees are not a roadmap for peace, but efforts to legitimise its occupation and prepare for renewed aggression.
That is why strengthening the Armed Forces of Ukraine, developing its defence industries, and shifting aid onto industrial channels are not signs of militarising the conflict, they are the only means of bringing real peace closer. This approach removes Moscow’s illusions of military victory.
Kyiv is acting rationally and in line with national interests: it does not barter sovereignty, remains open to negotiations without preconditions, demands contracts and capabilities, not symbolic gestures, and insists that any feudal-style Russian veto over Ukraine’s security is unacceptable. Meanwhile, despite internal debates over formats, the West is effectively moving in unison: from rhetorical support to real security frameworks and multi-year financing of Ukrainian defence. That trajectory counters Kremlin attempts to wear down Western resolve.
Simply put, as of late August 2025: Putin lost a diplomatic round he hoped would pressure Kyiv; the US and Europe refused to accept any Russian veto over Ukraine’s security; Kyiv is securing support through predictable agreements; European capitals are developing practical ways to bolster the Ukrainian Armed Forces and prevent a Russian resurgence; any pause without credible deterrents and enforcement is seen as a false peace.
Therefore, the only realistic way to end the war is to sustain strong support for Ukraine, continually dispel Kremlin myths about guarantees, and remember this: peace in Europe relies on the strength of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the West’s political resolve to prevent Moscow from rewriting the rules.
