Photo by Nurgissa Ussen on Unsplash
Article by our Staff Reporter
The recent parliamentary election (19 March) in Kazakhstan was the fourth time that the country’s voters have gone to the polls in a little over two years, and the third time within the past nine months. While the treadmill of elections over this period manifested the country’s march towards democratic change, the expected headwinds of voter fatigue produced a turnout of 54 percent, although this figure is still on par with Canada, which averages 55 percent voter turnout.
The outgoing parliament and its lower chamber – the Mazhilis – had transformed the political environment ahead of recent elections in passing legislation adopting constitutional amendments approved by voters in a nationwide referendum on June 5 2022. These amendments included important reforms going far beyond electoral rules which restructured the entire political system. Specific to the elections, they introduced the possibility of self-nomination, easier party registration, and a lower electoral threshold for parties to enter parliament. The electoral reform was part of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s strategy to mobilize disenfranchised sectors of the country’s electorate.
The Organisation for Sevurity and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE’s) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) sent a team of more than 300 long-term and short-term observers who monitored the elections across the country. The team’s work was mostly unhindered in the performance of its duties. While expressing some reservations, the ODHIR team noted that the reforms had “increased choice for voters” and “brought elements of competitiveness into the political arena”, adding that candidates were able to campaign “actively and freely”. In a preliminary statement they also concluded that the elections were held in a context of reforms “introduced to bring Kazakhstan closer to holding elections in line with international standards and OSCE commitments.” This evaluation augurs well for Kazakhstan’s international reputation under Tokayev.
The relatively low turnout of 54 percent clearly indicates that Kazakhstan is moving away from the previous practice of mass mobilization to ensure survival of an authoritarian regime. But it also indicates some voter fatigue: this is the third time in nine months that the electorate has been asked to vote, and the second time in a little over two years that they have elected a new Mazhilis. Overall, the results appear to be an endorsement of the creation of a broader political field and a multi-party system, one of Tokayev’s intended reforms.
The ruling Amanat party won but only just. Its majority of 53.9% is significantly less than what former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s Nur Otan party used to have, but at the same time it was not labelled as the “president’s party”. As per recent constitutional amendments, the president cannot be a member of any party, therefore Tokayev, who relinquished the party chairmanship last year, did not campaign. According to Kazakh observers, Amanat not only has a new name but also a new leadership and “a strongly updated slate of candidates”.
It is noteworthy that there was no consolidation of opposition in the single-mandate districts. Representatives of the protest movements that participated as candidates had the opportunity to demonstrate that they attract serious support from the country’s civil society; however, they failed to do so as the general electorate did not give them their vote. This suggests that their popularity may be exaggerated on social media, and they failed in the real test. The population at large did not back them even at the maslikhat (regional assembly) level.
Several parties entered parliament following the 19 March elections. Second place went to the Auyl party, which is supported by local elites and internal migrants in the cities who harken back to their rural roots. The Respublika party, which took the third place, sought to represent young businesspeople but seems to have received votes due only to its novelty (the party was registered just prior to the elections). The Ak Zhol party, which under the Nazarbayev regime represented a technocratic counter-elite dissatisfied with the then-ruling kleptocracy, also managed to gain seats in parliament.
Yet it seems that none of these parties, whether old or new, have really captured the electorate’s imagination possibly because the population at large still sees most of them — even the new Baytak environmental party and the old National Social Democratic Party —as “mouthpieces” for different segments of the economic and political elite rather than as real advocates for their own everyday concerns. The new parties also had no track record and did not make an effort to build long-lasting relations with voters using the time-consuming but effective tactic of “door-to-door” campaigning.
One notably absent party in these elections was the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan party, originally founded by fugitive banker Mukhtar Ablyazov in 2001 and re-established in 2017. However, his various legal issues seem to have put paid to his political ambitions.
The electoral cycle over the last two years, particularly last year’s referendum on constitutional reforms and the presidential election last November, has, it may be argued, shown that Tokayev recognizes the need for incontestable popular support for his reform agenda. He has grounded his presidency in economic and political restructuring – to build up the middle class as a long-term guarantor for Kazakhstan’s further sustainable development. Therefore, since the January 2022 events, when Kazakhstan experienced an attempted coup, Tokayev has become relentless in his campaign against the “old Kazakhstan’s” elite and the prosecutor’s case in the Jusan group affair further demonstrates Tokayev’s determination.
The composition of the new Mazhilis leaves President Tokayev poised to make further progress and to institutionalize the thoroughgoing political, economic and social reforms over the longer term by finally ridding the legislature of most holdover deadwood from the Nazarbayev era.
