Photo by 愚木混株 Yumu on Unsplash
In July 2025, EU Political Report published an investigative article entitled “Icebreakers Hide Deadly Nuclear Threat”, which revealed a series of potential risks associated with the operation of RITM-200 nuclear reactors on Russian icebreakers. The article criticised the lack of transparency surrounding the programme, unreported technical incidents, and the broader risks of extending this technology to land-based modular power units. The RITM-200 reactors are being actively promoted as the backbone of new compact nuclear solutions intended for remote areas, including export markets. However, new information from industry insiders raises doubts not only about the technical reliability of these units but also regarding legal responsibility in the event of an accident.
According to available data, in 2024 a serious technical incident occurred aboard one of the nuclear-powered icebreakers using a RITM-200 reactor. It reportedly involved a loss of primary circuit integrity, leading to coolant leakage into the third circuit. If confirmed, this indicates potential design or manufacturing flaws with direct implications for nuclear and radiological safety. The primary circuit is a sealed system that cools the reactor core and isolates radioactive coolant. Its integrity is vital, and any breach of this barrier increases the risk of radiation exposure to adjacent systems, reactor malfunctions, and potential contamination.
This incident is particularly troubling given Russia’s intentions to deploy RITM-200 technology on land, especially through the building of so-called Modernised Floating Power Units (MFPUs). These installations imitate marine reactor designs while complicating the accountability framework further by involving international supply chains. One of the main foreign actors in this network is the Chinese company Wison Heavy Industry Co., Ltd., which participates in constructing the platforms and hulls for these floating power units.
Under Russian law, specifically Article 40 of Federal Law No. 170-FZ, the responsibility for ensuring nuclear and radiological safety rests not only with the operating organisation but also with the chief design bureau and the shipbuilding entity. In the case of RITM-200, this includes Russian companies such as JSC Iceberg Central Design Bureau (the chief designer) and JSC Baltic Shipyard (the builder). However, when a project involves foreign partners, as is the case with MFPUs, this responsibility is no longer limited to domestic actors.
Wison Heavy Industry, as a contractor involved in constructing essential structural parts of these nuclear platforms, effectively becomes a co-responsible party in the event of a technical failure or nuclear incident. This is supported by nuclear law norms and international practice, which clearly state that any company supplying components or infrastructure for nuclear facilities shares responsibility for safety outcomes. Participation in a nuclear construction project extends beyond merely fulfilling an engineering contract – it also includes potential legal and financial accountability, including for environmental damage or accidents.
It remains unclear whether Wison Heavy Industry has internal safety assessment procedures in place or is subject to independent audits for the nuclear-related projects it is involved in with Russian entities. It is also unknown whether the company’s liability is contractually defined or whether insurance coverage exists for nuclear-related damages. These questions are critical, especially given that the RITM-200 reactor design has already raised technical concerns, and its deployment is being considered in other countries.
The situation sets an important precedent: in today’s nuclear landscape, safety transcends national borders. When a foreign company is involved in designing or building nuclear infrastructure, it must also bear part of the responsibility, both morally and legally. Roles within the supply chain should carry proportional accountability. In the case of Wison Heavy Industry, this means the company should be recognised not only in discussions of economic cooperation but also in conversations about nuclear safety. In the nuclear energy sector, where human lives and environmental health are at risk, responsibility must be recognised globally.
