Photo by Hao Zhang on Unsplash
By all appearances, Russia is positioning itself as a global leader in nuclear technology, promoting innovations like the RITM-200 small modular reactor (SMR) as a key element of energy independence for remote regions and developing nations alike. Sleek promotional campaigns by Rosatom promise high-tech, compact, and safe nuclear solutions – whether on icebreakers in the Arctic or in isolated inland territories such as Yakutia. But beneath this polished exterior lies a much more troubling reality: the supposed greatness of Russia’s nuclear programme is in fact a construct built on untested technology, withheld safety data, and a systemic disregard for international norms.
The RITM-200 reactor, initially designed for use aboard nuclear icebreakers, is now being marketed for civilian land-based deployment. In 2023, Russia began preparing a site in Yakutia for the country’s first land-based SMR, declaring it a model for clean and decentralised power. However, seismic surveys of the site — situated in an active fault zone — remain incomplete, even as construction continues under an early-issued licence. In November 2024, the official safety review process was suspended after the assessment application was abruptly withdrawn. This alone should have raised major alarms across the international community.
A national safety review identified over 800 critical technical issues with the project. Importantly, the developers failed to incorporate operational experience from the RITM-200 units already in operation aboard nuclear icebreakers, which have experienced serious faults including cracks in the primary cooling circuit and instances of control rods unexpectedly dropping into the reactor core — a potentially disasterous malfunction. However, Rosatom continues to regard these marine-based units as proven when promoting land-based SMRs to international buyers.
From a technical perspective, this is reckless. The integrity of a reactor’s primary cooling system is crucial to preventing overheating or a potential meltdown. Similarly, any loss of control over the reactor core’s chain reaction, such as through malfunctioning control rods, presents a severe safety risk. Yet the manufacturer has continued to minimise these incidents publicly, while emphasising supposed design robustness.
Further compounding these concerns are reports indicating inadequate reliability in the emergency cooling systems and reactor control mechanisms. Despite these limitations, Russia officially extended the expected service life of the RITM-200 to 60 years – a figure which appears entirely arbitrary and is contradicted by internal data suggesting critical components may begin to fail within just 2–3 years of operation.
The situation at sea remains grim. Since their commissioning in 2021, Russia’s nuclear icebreakers “Arktika,” “Sibir,” and “Ural” have experienced at least 79 operational incidents, with 45 deemed serious. These include repeated cracks in coolant systems and control rod failures. In any Western country, such a safety record would prompt independent investigations, fleet-wide shutdowns, and public accountability. In Russia, however, it remains business as usual.
Most concerning of all is the lack of a functioning safety culture. During the construction of both ships and land-based stations, there is no legally designated operating entity thereby creating significant legal uncertainty regarding nuclear and radiation safety responsibilities. Meanwhile, Russia has failed to fully disclose critical incidents to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), instead promoting the RITM-200 as one of the world’s safest and most modern reactors.
For the international community, this is not a distant issue. Moscow is actively promoting the RITM-200 to partners in Central Asia, Africa, and South Asia — often in countries that lack strong nuclear oversight or regulatory systems. In these situations, selling a reactor system that already shows structural weaknesses and safety issues borders on negligence.
Beneath the rhetoric of innovation lies a worrying truth: RITM-200 is not a proven solution but an under-tested product with serious design flaws, managed within a system that lacks transparency or accountability. Its worldwide promotion as a breakthrough in safe, decentralised energy is misleading at best — and dangerously irresponsible at worst.
Russia’s nuclear ambitions, like its broader industrial propaganda, are a carefully staged performance – one that aims to project technological superiority while hiding critical vulnerabilities. If the West is serious about a secure and sustainable nuclear future, it must resist the temptation to take these claims at face value. Technology built on fractured steel and political opacity has no place in the global energy transition.
