Photo by Roman Kopylov on Unsplash
Europeans should forget about the two things said to worry them most – invasion by Russia and the United States’ desertion of NATO. For compelling reasons, neither of these nightmare scenarios is likely.
This article examines the supposed threat of a Russian military incursion into a member state of the European Union. A future article will examine why, despite his rhetoric, Donald Trump has no rational interest in provoking the dissolution, or even weakening, of the Atlantic alliance.
The spectre of a Russian foray into the EU, perhaps into one of the Baltic republics, has been widely touted because it is feared that Moscow’s military advances in eastern Ukraine are whetting President Vladimir Putin’s expansionist appetite.
This has been the tenor of NATO’s briefings to journalists, while emphasising the need to boost Europe’s defence spending for the foreseeable future. The alliance’s usually taciturn HQ in Brussels has labelled as stupid reluctant investors that are proving slow to plough cash into European defence companies.
Putin is nevertheless widely acknowledged to have done more to revive Europe’s sluggish defence sector than decades of exhortation on either side of the Atlantic. Largely unquestioned in Europe’s frantic catch-up efforts, however, is why Russia would contemplate invading countries that are part of NATO and the EU.
The four key questions of ‘When, Where, Why and How’ all elude common-sense analysis of the Kremlin’s political intentions and military capacities. Putin’s ambition to recover Ukraine is, although profoundly reprehensible, rooted in comparatively recent history, as are Beijing’s in relation to Taiwan. But Russia’s historical relationships with the Baltic republics or Poland offer no such rationale.
As to timing, it is widely reckoned that Putin or his successors would need at least 10-15 years to regroup their armed forces now seriously over-stretched in Ukraine. Russia’s predominant need would in any case be to resolve its acute manpower shortages; there quite simply aren’t enough potential recruits to man a fresh invasion force, and Russia’s dramatically shrinking demographics guarantee there won’t be.
That leaves the question of why? What possible advantage from occupying neighbouring countries could outweigh the risks of a major confrontation that might lead to a nuclear conflict? It certainly wouldn’t be for the mineral or agricultural resources that Russia already possesses in vast quantities. Nor markets, given its lack of the manufacturing and service industries to exploit them.
None of this is to say that Europeans should dismiss Russia’s aggressive behaviour as mere sabre-rattling. The dangers are very real, but chiefly because the greatest threat to Europe is its own lack of cohesion and common purpose on defence policies and spending commitments.
Russians’ sentiments about Europe have always been hard to understand and define. Envy, resentment and national pride verging on paranoia all seem the ingredients of the Kremlin’s very unstable foreign policy. Much clearer is Russia’s use of disruption and division to express its hostility.
Cyber-tactics and undersea cable-cutting are only pinpricks. But Europe’s incoherent responses have shown weakness in the face of aggression. The economic sanctions imposed on Russia, at first in retaliation for its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and then to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, have been unconvincing and ineffective. At best they are applied sporadically, and at worst are cynically flouted by European companies. EU governments’ financial support for Ukraine and their supplies of defence equipment are similarly uneven.
Putin’s backing from right-wing populist regimes and political parties in central and eastern Europe stems from his support for their nationalist agendas. Russia’s aim is to fragment the European Union, and this appeals to voters looking to place the blame for their falling living standards. In spite of all the EU has achieved, its promise of an ever closer union is for many people no longer an unquestioned beacon of hope.
There’s no doubting that it’s crucially important to restore Europe’s collective defence capabilities. Not so much because of an imagined Russian invasion, but because a unified approach to massive technological upheavals in weapons systems is essential. Europe’s security outreach in its Mediterranean neighbourhood is also a key factor. Both of these will only be credible once they become independent of rogue political shifts in Washington.
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The Author, Giles Merritt, is the Founding Director of the Friends of Europe.
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